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The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 has two exemptions—
Exemption 62 and Exemption 7(C)3that specifically allow a requested 
document to be withheld to protect the privacy of persons named 
within. For the first two decades of FOIA’s history, the use of those 
two exemptions by Executive Branch agencies was not particularly 
notable. This changed with the Reporters Committee ruling by the 
Supreme Court in 1989 on the concerns of people named in 
government-held documents.4 Since then, scholars have examined the 
growing trend of privacy exceptionalism in agency denials of requests 





1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2016). 
2 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2016) (allowing the withholding of “personnel and medical 
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy”). 
3 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2016) (allowing the withholding of law enforcement-
related documents that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy”). 
4 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989). This ruling will be discussed in detail at infra notes 21-28 and accompanying 
text. 
5 See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk, Blurred Vision: How Supreme Court FOIA Opinions 
on Invasion of Privacy Have Missed the Target of Legislative Intent, 4 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 111 (1999); Martin E. Halstuk, Policy of Secrecy - Pattern of Deception: 
What Federalist Leaders Thought about a Public Right to Know, 1794-98, 7 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 51 (2002); Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes: 
The Escalating Conflict Between Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability 
Principle of Democracy, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 71 (2003); Martin E. Halstuk, 
When Is an Invasion of Privacy Unwarranted Under the FOIA? An Analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s “Sufficient Reason” and “Presumption of Legitimacy” Standards, 
16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361 (2005). 
6 See, e.g., Micah Altman, Alexandra Wood, David R. O'Brien, Salil Vadhan & Urs 
Gasser, Towards a Modern Approach to Privacy-Aware Government Data Releases, 
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1967 (2015); Clay Calvert, Austin Vining, & Sebastian 
Zarate, Reining in Internet-Age Expansion of Exemption 7(C): Towards a Tort Law 
Approach for Ferreting out Legitimate Privacy Concerns and Unwarranted 
Intrusions Under FOIA, 70 SMU L. REV. 255 (2017); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic 
Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2013); Kathryn 
Shephard, Mug Shot Disclosure Under FOIA: Does Privacy or Public Interest 
Prevail, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (2013).  
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shown, the Reporters Committee precedent has enabled agencies to 
deny FOIA requests for documents to protect the supposed privacy 
rights of any person whose name appears therein, even if they are not 
relevant to the document’s topic. Thus, a trend has emerged in FOIA 
jurisprudence in which someone’s personal privacy has become more 
exceptional7 than the information on governmental operations to be 
found within the requested documents. This trend in document 
disclosure practices gives the impression that the American 
government cares deeply about the personal privacy of individuals 
named in sensitive documents that could be perused by strangers if 
agencies hand them over to requesters. In fact, even as the government 
claims that privacy should be safeguarded when someone requests a 
document, researchers have located some absurd examples of this 





7 The concept of privacy exceptionalism in FOIA privacy disputes was first 
developed, though not under that particular name, in Michael Hoefges, Martin E. 
Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure Policy: The 
“Uses and Effects” Double Standard in Access to Personally Identifiable 
Information in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2003). The 
term privacy exceptionalism was first defined precisely, in the context of the 
Reporters Committee ruling and its aftermath, in Martin E. Halstuk, Pa. State Univ., 
Benjamin W. Cramer, Pa. State Univ., and Michael D. Todd, Univ. of N.H., Public 
Interest…what Public Interest? How the Rehnquist Court Created the FOIA Privacy 
Exceptionalism Doctrine, Paper Presented at the Association for Education in 
Journalism and Mass Communication Annual Conference (Aug. 12, 2012). 
8 The absurd uses of privacy to deny requests for government-held documents 
range from the comical to the tragic. For example, in 2002 the National Zoo in 
Washington, D.C. denied the Washington Post access to the medical records of a 
giraffe that had died, on the grounds that disclosure would violate the dead 
animal’s privacy rights. See National Zoo Asserts Animal Privacy, ACCESS REP., 
May 8, 2002, at 9. In 2011, the Federal Communications Commission refused to 
disclose documents on how a telephone company handled thousands of dollars of 
taxpayer money because the documents contained the name of a company 
employee whose privacy was apparently at risk. See Benjamin W. Cramer, Privacy 
Exceptionalism and Confidentiality Versus the Public Interest in Uncovering 
Universal Service Fraud, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 149, 170-71 (2015). On the more 
tragic side, in the 1980s the U.S. Department of State refused to release the names 
of Haitian refugees for reasons of privacy, even though activists were prepared to 
shield those persons from persecution in their homeland. This resulted in the 
Supreme Court case U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991), which will be 
discussed in detail at infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 




And, even if the American government truly cares about a citizen’s 
personal privacy, its attitudes and practices in other realms of 
governance suggest the opposite. As seen in the Edward Snowden 
revelations of 20139 and subsequent political controversies,10 any 
governmental claim that it wishes to protect citizens’ personal privacy 
has become nonsensical, if not downright farcical. Outside of 
documents withheld from disclosure under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 
7(C), evidence indicates that the American government at large now 
views personal privacy as inherently unexceptional, or not nearly 
important enough to overcome the demands of the rapidly-spreading 
surveillance state.11 As opposed to the privacy exceptionalism detected 
by scholars in the use of FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), the 







9 This heavily reported event was first reported by journalist Glenn Greenwald; for a 
summary of his early reports, see generally GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO 
HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014). 
10 The desire of the national security establishment to collect citizens’ personal 
communications records has mutated into (among other things) demands for tech 
companies to de-encrypt communications and calls for Executive Branch authority 
to restrict the use of telecommunications systems and the Internet during 
emergencies. See, e.g., Scott M. Ruggiero, Killing the Internet to Keep America 
Alive: The Myths and Realities of the Internet Kill Switch, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH.L. 
REV. 241, 241-42 (2012); Katie Benner & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has 
Unlocked iPhone Without Apple, N.Y. TIMES (March 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphone-fbi-justice-
department-case.html [https://perma.cc/YU5Y-UHD3]. 
11 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008); Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data 
Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773 (2015); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment 
in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309 (2012); Joel R. Reidenberg, The 
Data Surveillance State in the United States and Europe, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
583 (2014); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, 
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014); Eric M. Yesner, 
Government Surveillance Through New Technology: Rethinking the Third-Party 
Doctrine's Implications on the Fourth Amendment, 19 HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 135 (2015). 
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This article will explore the American government’s contradictory 
stances toward personal privacy, via an analysis of the jurisprudence 
surrounding FOIA and the Privacy Act of 1974,12  while comparing 
that to surveillance-oriented jurisprudence surrounding the actions of 
various agencies in the national security and law enforcement 
establishments. Furthermore, the article will argue that this 
contradiction is not just a matter of defining values, but it also allows 
the government to violate the spirit of government transparency and 
the value of privacy in two different ways while becoming more 
secretive across the board. 
 
The next section of this article will review the jurisprudence 
surrounding Exemptions 6 and 7(C) of FOIA, and the trends that have 
resulted in judicial deference toward agency rejections of FOIA 
requests for often facetious reasons of personal privacy—what 
researchers have dubbed privacy exceptionalism. The third section will 
perform a similar analysis of the Privacy Act of 1974 as another 
example of the American government’s professed concern for 
protecting personal privacy through document management practices. 
 
The fourth section of the article will review how the national security 
and law enforcement establishments have largely disdained or ignored 
personal privacy as it conducts antiterrorism investigations and 
widespread electronic surveillance of citizens, in ways that contradict 
the agencies’ own statements on privacy protections and also 
contradict the rest of the American government’s supposed concerns 
about privacy as a reason to reject requests for documents. In that 
section, the evidence will point to a new type of privacy 
unexceptionalism, because privacy values have been unable to 
overcome the excesses of the surveillance state, and because the 
surveillance state ignores those values altogether. The article will 
conclude with a discussion of the contradictions between these two 
views of privacy in the American government, and the possible 
ramifications for civil liberties when citizens seek information about 






12 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2014). 
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II. Privacy Exceptionalism in FOIA Jurisprudence 
 
Upon its passage in 1966, FOIA included two privacy provisions at 
Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which can be cited by executive branch 
agencies to deny a FOIA request for documents. However, there was 
no indication that Congress intended document disclosure to be 
trumped by privacy values in any significant way, and such a thing did 
not happen in any notable fashion before 1989.13 Exemption 6 allows 
government agencies to withhold “personnel and medical files and 
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”14 During debates on the 
need for Exemption 6, the U.S. Senate stated that this exemption 
should maintain a balance between the “protection of an individual’s 
private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation 
of the public’s right to governmental information.”15  
 
Meanwhile, Exemption 7(C) works in a similar fashion but pertains 
specifically to the documents compiled during a law enforcement 
investigation. This exemption operates under the belief that the 
persons named in such documents could face harm from the disclosure 
of their identities, or that disclosure could hamper the investigation.16 
The text of Exemption 7(C) requires the government agency to prove 
that disclosure could “reasonably be expected” to constitute an 
invasion of privacy that would threaten a named individual’s safety.17 
Exemption 7(C) was intended to favor personal privacy more strongly 
than Exemption 6, thanks to the sensitivity of law enforcement 





13 Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower 
Court Treatment of the Reporters Committee “Central Purpose” Reformulation, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 983, 1021 (2002). 
14 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2016). Congress wrote this exemption to include “personnel 
and medical files” but noted that these were only meant to be examples of possible 
categories and were not meant to exclude other categories of information that could 
be considered private. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 11 (1966). 
15 See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965). 
16 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2016). 
17 Id. 
312 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.2 
 
 
against the public interest in the other information to be found in the 
requested documents.18  
 
This proposed balance of interests indicates that Congress did not 
intend for privacy rights, through abuse or overuse of FOIA 
Exemptions 6 or 7(C), to easily overcome public knowledge of 
governmental operations.19 Initially, a government agency that denied 
a FOIA request for reasons of personal privacy carried the burden of 
proof in showing that the concerns of the private individual named in 
the document outweighed the public interest in disclosure.20  
 
The turning point on this matter was the Reporters Committee ruling 
of 1989,21 at which time the Supreme Court constructed—“out of 
whole cloth” in the later estimation of the plaintiffs22—a previously 
non-existent “central purpose [of FOIA] . . . to ensure that the 
Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, 
not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the 
warehouse of the Government be so disclosed.”23 This was an abrupt 
departure from previous FOIA practice. 
 
The Reporters Committee case arose when television reporter Robert 
Schakne filed a FOIA request for FBI records on Charles Medico, who 
was involved with a mob-dominated company that in turn was under 
investigation for its connection to a bribery scandal surrounding 





18 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-226, at 18 (2005). 
19 See Hoefges, Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 13. 
20 See, e.g., Aronson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 822 F.2d 182, 187-88 
(1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting a vague government justification for withholding data on 
private persons); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 450 F.2d 698, 703-05 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the burden of justifying nondisclosure must be met 
by the government).  
21 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989). 
22 See Brief for the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, Office of Indep. Counsel v. Favish, 541 
U.S. 157 (2004) (no. 02-954). 
23 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774 (emphasis removed). 
24 Id. at 757. 
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some of the requested records, it withheld others under the rationale 
that they invaded Medico’s privacy.25 After an 11-year court battle 
between Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the 
Department of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled that when requesting 
documents in which private persons are named for virtually any 
reason, the requester is required to provide evidence that the public 
interest in the documents outweighs the personal privacy interest of the 
persons named within.26  
 
According to Justice John Paul Stevens, FOIA’s “central purpose” was 
to enlighten citizens about the workings of government, not to expose 
the private affairs of individuals,27 and in this particular case, the Court 
determined that the requested rap sheets on Medico would not educate 
the public on the workings of the FBI or the Congressman that the 
reporter was investigating.28  
 
Before Reporters Committee, in the words of Halstuk and Davis, 
“courts routinely held that the FOIA can be used for any private or 
public purpose, without the need for a requester [to] be required to 
justify a request.”29 But after Reporters Committee, whenever a 
government agency denies a FOIA request by citing personal privacy, 
the requester now has the very difficult and often impossible task of 
proving that the public interest in the information on governmental 
operations found in the documents will outweigh the privacy interest 
of persons named within; and paradoxically, the requester must often 
make this argument without even seeing the documents in question 
because the FOIA request is still being processed.30 This is the result 
of the previously unknown “central purpose” of FOIA as created by 
Justice Stevens in the ruling. Stevens’s future Supreme Court 





25 Id. This withholding decision cited FOIA Exemption 7(C), protecting the privacy 
of persons mentioned in documents related to law enforcement investigations. 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2016). 
26 See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 13, at 989–90. 
27 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775. 
28 Id. at 774. 
29 See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 13, at 1021. 
30 See Cramer, supra note 8, at 183. 
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found in the statutory language of FOIA, and that the Reporters 
Committee ruling “changed the FOIA calculus.”31  
 
The Reporters Committee ruling enabled an explosion of FOIA denials 
for reasons of personal privacy, with agency usage of Exemptions 6 
and 7(C) increasing by leaps and bounds ever since, with little 
evidence that the trend will slow down anytime soon.32 Also, 
Exemptions 6 and 7(C) are now often cited simultaneously in agency 
denials of FOIA requests for documents—with Exemption 6 being 
used as a catch-all justification to withhold a document containing the 
name of any individual person, regardless of that person’s notability 
for the governmental operations discussed in the document; and with 
Exemption 7(C) being used to justify an expansive definition of “law 
enforcement” into myriad matters of national security and 
antiterrorism.33  
 
The “central purpose” test that the Supreme Court created out of whole 
cloth in the Reporters Committee ruling, requiring that requesters 
prove in court that their requested documents can fulfill the supposed 
central purpose of FOIA to provide illumination on matters of the 
public interest, has dramatically narrowed the scope of records 
available to citizens via FOIA request.34  Lower courts have generally 
adopted the “central purpose” test to conclude that document 
requesters must prove that the documents directly shed light on a 





31 U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 505–07 (1994) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
32 See Martin E. Halstuk, Benjamin W. Cramer & Michael D. Todd, Tipping the 
Scales: How the U.S. Supreme Court Eviscerated Freedom of Information in Favor 
of Privacy, in TRANSPARENCY 2.0: DIGITAL DATA AND PRIVACY IN A WIRED 
WORLD 16, 20-24 (Charles N. Davis & David Cuillier eds., 2014). 
33 Id. The expansion of the FOIA law enforcement exemptions being used to justify a 
growing range of practices that were previously considered to be national security, 
and not necessarily law enforcement, will be discussed later in this article. See infra 
Section IV. 
34 See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 13, at 997. 
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the invasion of privacy for any person named therein, regardless of the 
utility of any of the other information presented in the document.35  
 
Before the advent of the “central purpose” test, the federal courts, 
when addressing privacy-related FOIA denials, generally performed an 
analysis that balanced the privacy interests of the individual against the 
public interest in disclosure, with each having a roughly equal chance 
of success.36 According to Halstuk and Davis, the Reporters 
Committee ruling brought an unceremonious end to this type of 
analysis, and since 1989 there has been a “blanket denial of nearly all 
requests for lists of names because such records fall beyond the 
‘central purpose’ of the FOIA, and also the end of any sort of judicial 
reflection of the potential benefits of disclosure.”37  
 
Reporters Committee and two similar Supreme Court holdings on the 
importance of personal privacy over the public interest in obtaining 
government-held documents—Department of State v. Washington Post 
Co.38 and National Records and Archives Admin. v. Favish39—are 





35 See, e.g., Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 194 F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (ruling that the release of autopsy photographs is an invasion of privacy for the 
deceased person pictured or his/her relatives); Comput. Prof. for Soc. Resp. v. Secret 
Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ruling that the requester must offer 
compelling evidence of agency misconduct, and prove that this misconduct 
outweighs the privacy rights of named individuals, before receiving law 
enforcement-related documents). Note that the “central purpose” concocted by 
Justice Stevens in Reporters Committee is sometimes called the “core purpose” in 
later rulings. 
36 See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 13, at 1001-02. This technique was first 
formulated by the Supreme Court in Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 
353-54 (1976) (allowing researchers to access the academic and disciplinary 
records of students at the Air Force Academy). 
37 See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 13, at 1002. 
38 U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 601-03 (1982) (ruling that 
government-held records on Iranian nationals living in the United States, during a 
period of extensive strife between the two nations, would violate those persons’ 
privacy). 
39 Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 173-75 (2004) (ruling 
that crime scene photographs can be withheld to protect the personal privacy of the 
victim’s family, despite public interest in the victim and in the crime itself). 
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uphold agency FOIA denials for reasons of privacy, with little regard 
for other arguments.40 Particularly since the Reporters Committee and 
Washington Post rulings—both in the 1980s—the effectiveness of 
FOIA has been hampered by attempts to protect the privacy of 
individuals named in documents regardless of the public interest in 
governmental operations described in those same documents.41  
Excessive use of such exemptions by agencies, as enabled by these 
Supreme Court precedents, has led one Congressional committee to 
declare that “FOIA . . . is broken.”42  
 
The use of the FOIA privacy exemptions by government agencies to 
withhold documents has resulted in many questionable conclusions on 
the value of personal privacy, with the U.S. Department of Justice 
complaining that even the presence of non-intimate personal 
information could justify withholding a requested document.43 Also, 
the Supreme Court has neglected to provide any detailed listing of the 
types of information that should (or should not) justify withholding a 
document on privacy grounds, thus allowing agencies to decide what 
is “private.”44  
 
In one of the more absurd post-Reporters Committee rulings on this 
matter, the Supreme Court refused to overturn a FOIA rejection by the 





40 See A. Jay Wagner, A Secret Police: The Lasting Impact of the 1986 FOIA 
Amendments, 23 COMM. L. & POL’Y 387, 414 (2018). 
41 See Tyler Prime & Joseph Russomanno, The Future of FOIA: Course 
Corrections for the Digital Age, 23 COMM. L. & POL’Y 267, 270 (2018). 
42 Staff Of H.R. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong., FOIA is 
Broken: A Report 39 (2016), https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/FINAL-FOIA-Report-January-2016.pdf. For an 
executive summary, see Christopher J. Walker, FOIA Is Broken: New Chaffetz 
House Oversight Committee Report, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Jan. 
14, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/foia-is-broken-new-chaffetz-house-oversight-
committee-report-by-chris- walker/ [https://perma.cc/FJH2-6VY9]. 
43 Office of Info. and Privacy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, A 325-27 (Pamela Maida ed., 
2002). 
44 See Lillian R. BeVier, Information about Individuals in the Hands of Government: 
Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 455, 490 (1995). 
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fled to America in the 1980s. Supporters of these refugees requested 
information on whether any of them were being considered for 
deportation back to Haiti, in the fear that they would then be 
persecuted by that country’s ruling regime. The agency denied the 
request under FOIA Exemption 6 because the personal privacy of the 
individuals named would be violated. Their privacy interests 
apparently outweighed real evidence of physical danger and the efforts 
of activists to find out who they were in order to protect them. The 
Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning, stating that “mere 
speculation about hypothetical public benefits cannot outweigh a 
demonstrably significant invasion of privacy,”45 The Court also 
suggested that there had to be some evidence that the general public 
beyond just the requesters would find the documents worthwhile.46  
 
That final point about the general public was reaffirmed by the 
Supreme Court in a later ruling that supported the withholding of 
employment documents by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. 
Here, the Court emphasized that “the only relevant public interest in 
the FOIA [privacy] balancing analysis [is] the extent to which 
disclosure of the information sought would shed light on an agency’s 
performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what 
their government is up to.”47 Again, this requires requesters to prove 
the public interest value of documents that they have not yet seen. 
Since Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court has not ruled in favor 
of the disclosure of documents in a FOIA dispute in which agencies 
invoked the privacy exemptions, and is unlikely to do so as long as any 
comparison of the privacy interest versus public interest is framed via 





45 Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179 (1991). 
46 See id. at 178. 
47 Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) (emphasis 
added) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, a labor union requested 
agency-held documents on union members in order to gather information it felt was 
reasonably necessary for collective bargaining purposes. Id. at 488-90. The requested 
documents included addresses, and similar information, so the agency denied the 
request under FOIA Exemption 6. Id. at 488. 
48 See Cramer, supra note 8, at 183-84. Note that the “central purpose” doctrine 
has occasionally been criticized by the judiciary for its restrictive nature and for 




The public interest is now at an automatic disadvantage when it 
conflicts with privacy in a FOIA dispute,49 and there is evidence that 
agencies may be tempted to over-invoke the FOIA privacy exemptions 
to deny document requests, with less worry of being overturned by the 
courts.50 By 2000, Exemption 6 had become the most commonly used 
exemption at federal agencies to justify FOIA denials, with Exemption 
7(C) in a close second. All other exemptions were significantly 
behind.51 By 2017, the most recent year for which records were 
available at the time of writing, Exemptions 6 and 7(C) were still the 
two most frequently used, with evidence that they are also frequently 
used together.52  
 
Harold L. Cross, who advised Congress on the development and 
passage of FOIA, made a forceful statement on why citizens should 
know what their government is doing: “Public business is the public’s 
business. The people have the right to know. Freedom of information 
 
the fact that it was not present in previous FOIA jurisprudence, though without 
tipping any ruling toward disclosure. See, e.g., Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor 
Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 507 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
49 See Robert Gellman, Public Records – Access, Privacy, and Public Policy: A 
Discussion Paper, 12 GOV’T INFO. Q. 391, 391 (1995). 
50 See Cramer, supra note 8, at 182. 
51 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DOJ FOIA 2000 ANNUAL REPORT – OTHER REASONS FOR 
NONDISCLOSURE, https://www.justice.gov/oip/doj-foia-2000-annual-report-other-
reasons-nondisclosure [https://perma.cc/DZ4H-2V6U]. 
52 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 § V.B.(3) (2018), https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/file/102459 
6/download. During fiscal year 2017, Exemption 6 was used 9,239 times to reject 
FOIA requests and Exemption 7(C) was used 9,286 times. One of the other law 
enforcement exemptions, 7(E), was in a distant third place at 4,809 uses. Id. 
Exemption 7(E) allows the withholding of documents that “would disclose 
techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or 
would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such 
disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (b)(7)(E) (2016). Exemptions 6 and 7(C), both dealing with privacy, are 
typically used in tandem and their separate meanings are often intertwined when 
used by agencies to justify FOIA denials. Either of these exemptions, and frequently 
both together, are cited in at least three-fifths of FOIA denials by agencies in recent 
years. See Prime & Russomanno, supra note 41, at 288; Wagner, supra note 40, at 
414, 421. 
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is their just heritage. Without that the citizens of a democracy have but 
changed their kings.”53  This philosophy still occasionally appears in 
FOIA jurisprudence; for example, the Supreme Court asserted in 2004 
that government transparency is “a structural necessity in a real 
democracy” and that access to documents provides a “means for 
citizens to know what the Government is up to.”54 Unfortunately, this 
standard has withered away when those documents contain personal 
information, however slight or inconsequential it may be. 
 
III. The Spirit of the Privacy Act of 1974 
 
The Privacy Act of 197455 was passed at a time of growing 
Congressional concern about the increasing sophistication and 
pervasiveness of computers and databases that could gather personal 
information on American citizens.56 As opposed to the pro-disclosure 
philosophy of FOIA, the Privacy Act compels government agencies to 
withhold records that contain personal information.57 In an ironic (or 
perhaps Machiavellian) twist, the Privacy Act was the outcome of a 
federal governmental inquiry on privacy rights convened by President 
Richard Nixon in early 1974, when he was under investigation for 
widespread violations of those same rights.58  
 
The Privacy Act was meant to temper the widespread disclosure of 
records containing personal information that was enabled by the 





53 HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW, at XIII (1953). 
54 Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160 (2004). 
55 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2014). 
56 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 7–8 (1974); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 3, 7–8 
(1974). 
57 Corizarek, Reconciling FOIA and the Privacy Act, National Archives: FOIA 
Ombudsman, OGIS (Oct. 26, 2012), https://foia.blogs.archives.gov/2012/10/26/ 
reconciling-foia-and-the-privacy-act/ [https://perma.cc/H8VJ-CBK6]. 
58 See Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The 
Failure of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 SOFTWARE 
L.J. 199, 211-13 (1993). 
59 See Robert E. Gregg, The Privacy Act of 1974, ARMY LAW., July 1975, at 25, 26, 
29. 
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note that the Privacy Act does not enforce any sort of right to privacy. 
Unlike the pro-disclosure and anti-secrecy philosophy of FOIA, which 
was based on centuries of democratic theory and the Founding 
Fathers’ distrust of centralized government,60 there is much less 
support for a right to privacy in America. Such a right was first 
proposed in an influential but exploratory article by Warren and 
Brandeis in 1890,61 but by the early 1970s the “right to privacy” 
(which is not mentioned in the Constitution) had only been cobbled 
together by the Supreme Court into an implied right through creative 
interpretations of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.62  
 
Also in the early 1970s, electronic surveillance, which does not require 
physical intrusion by law enforcement officers, inspired a renewed call 
for some sort of privacy protection for the common citizen, probably 
in the form of a statutory protection.63 Around that time there had been 
proposals for the establishment of a “National Data Center” to collect 
and store personal information on citizens in the interests of countering 
Communist intrusion and other supposed Cold War threats, which 
worried privacy advocates.64 Privacy statutes focused on precise 
categories of information began to appear, starting with the Fair Credit 






60 See Jerome J. Hanus & Harold C. Relyea, A Policy Assessment of the Privacy 
Act of 1974, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 555, 559-61 (1976). 
61 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
197 (1890). 
62 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). The Supreme Court had also suggested that the Fourth 
Amendment, which is typically viewed as a procedure for law enforcement 
officials to obtain a warrant before searching through a citizen’s personal effects, 
could be viewed as an indirect or implied right to privacy, though this conception 
was not dispositive to each case’s disputes over police procedures. Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
63 See Hanus & Relyea, supra note 60, at 562. 
64 See, e.g., The Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of 
the H.R. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 89th Cong. 195-213 (1966). 
65 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970). 
2020] CRAMER 321 
 
 
The Watergate scandal was the final straw, leading to the passage of 
the Privacy Act in late 1974, just four months after Richard Nixon’s 
resignation in light of the scandal. The Act received wide bipartisan 
support while being promoted by new President Gerald Ford in his 
efforts to help America recover from the excesses of Watergate.66 
House and Senate debates on the legislation focused on horror stories 
of intrusions on a citizen’s privacy and the threats that excessive 
surveillance might pose to freedom of speech and other constitutional 
rights.67  
 
While the Privacy Act did not establish a right to privacy or a right to 
be left alone by the government, it did establish statutory protection for 
citizens who believe that the government is mishandling their personal 
information.68 In other words, the Act places profound trust in the 
professionalism and discretion of government employees who have 
access to personal information. The Act established “fair information 
practices” for the collection and dissemination of information about 
individuals that is housed in federal agency files and databases.69 The 
Act prohibits the disclosure of any such record without the written 
consent of the individual.70  
 
The goal of the Privacy Act was to prevent the disclosure of personally 
identifiable records held by agencies, to grant individuals a right of 
access to documents in which they are identified, and to grant 
individuals the right to demand correction of documents about 
themselves that they believe to be inaccurate.71 Such rules must be 
observed by “any Executive department, military department, 
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other 





66 See Hanus & Relyea, supra note 60, at 569-70. 
67 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 4-6 (1974); S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 11-12 
(1974). 
68 See Hanus & Relyea, supra note 60, at 573. 
69 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2014). 
70 Id.  
71 See Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justi 
ce.gov/opcl/policy-objectives [https://perma.cc/7M8F-CLBW]. 
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(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent 
regulatory agency.”72  
 
The Privacy Act also includes precise rules for how agency officials 
handle personal information that comes into their possession. “No 
agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of 
records by any means of communication to any person, or to another 
agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior 
written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.”73 The 
Seventh Circuit has ruled that federal officials are “bound by the 
Privacy Act not to disclose any personal information and to take 
certain precautions to keep personal information confidential;”74 while 
the Tenth Circuit has ruled that this applies to “not only the physical 
disclosure of the records, but also the accessing of private records” by 
any agency other than the one that originally possesses them.75  
 
The Privacy Act includes exemptions, but these operate in the reverse 
fashion from FOIA’s exemptions by compelling agencies to not 
withhold personal information in certain situations. There are twelve 
such exemptions, with most pertaining to fairly arcane agency 
procedures, but there are two that are relevant to this article’s 
arguments. Exemption 7 of the Privacy Act compels agencies to 
disclose (typically to other agencies) documents that are needed for a 
law enforcement investigation,76 and Exemption 8 works in a similar 
fashion if it is believed that other agencies could help preserve the 
person’s health and safety.77 Such requests from other agencies must 





72 44 U.S.C. § 3502; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) (2014). 
73 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2014). 
74 Big Ridge, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 715 F.3d 631, 650 
(7th Cir. 2013). 
75 Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1268 (10th Cir. 2010). 
76 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7) (2014). 
77 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(8) (2014). 
78 Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Doe v. Naval Air Station, 768 
F.2d 1229, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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allegations” in which the requesting agency exaggerates the need for 
law enforcement or safety intervention.79  
 
It should be noted that the Privacy Act applies to actual “records” that 
are in an agency’s possession,80 and not necessarily to the content 
within, including information gained during surveillance. Therefore 
under the Act, the government can collect personal information on 
citizens however it pleases, even for exaggerated law enforcement or 
national security reasons, but must follow the Act’s requirements for 
when and how to disclose the resulting documents. The Act does not 
attempt to reduce government record-keeping or even surveillance, 
and trusts agency employees as the protectors of private information 
that ends up in their possession. This was a change in government 
document-handling procedures that acknowledged that era’s 
widespread public fear of abuses by unscrupulous officials.81  
 
In the meantime, Congress had become concerned about the rising 
computerization of data collection practices.82 Therefore the Privacy 
Act requires that the existence of governmental systems that collect 
personal information should not be concealed from the public.83 As an 
indication of how much surveillance has been perpetuated without the 
public’s knowledge since that provision was enacted in 1974, the 
American public did not know about many of the National Security 





79 Schwarz v. Interpol, Office of Info. & Privacy, No. 94-4111, 1995 WL 94664, at 
*1 n.2 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1995). 
80 “Records” are defined as “any item, collection, or grouping of information about 
an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his 
education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment 
history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other 
identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a 
photograph.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2014).  
81 See Hanus & Relyea, supra note 60, at 589. 
82 See Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, supra note 71. 
83 This was a recommendation from an advisory committee whose research was cited 
in the House and Senate debates. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 41 
(1973); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416 (1974); S. REP. NO. 93-3418 (1974). 
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Snowden revelations of 2013.84 As will be seen in the next section of 
this article, those systems were allowable under certain security-
oriented statutes. However, under the Privacy Act the secrecy of their 
existence was illegal.85  
 
Since Executive Branch agencies withhold so many documents from 
public view in order to protect the privacy of anyone named within, 
via either the Privacy Act or the privacy-oriented exemptions to FOIA, 
one might conclude that the American government cares deeply about 
the privacy of its citizens. Unfortunately, a look at the government’s 
attitudes toward privacy in other policy areas shows that this concern 
is only being expressed to avoid disclosing documents–or more 
cynically, the government shows concern for privacy as an easy way to 
maintain its secrets. As has been seen with the rise of the “surveillance 
state” after 2001, the American government enjoys keeping secrets but 
expects the citizenry to do the opposite. More specifically, the Privacy 
Act was passed because Congress was becoming concerned about the 
rapidly expanding electronic surveillance of citizens. That trend was 
just barely getting started in 1974, and government use of electronic 
surveillance, with often exaggerated security and law enforcement 
justifications (which are forbidden by the Privacy Act when handling 
the resulting documents86), has become more and more intrusive and 
pervasive. That old Congressional concern about privacy has moved in 
the opposite direction since the Privacy Act was passed. 
 
IV. Privacy Unexceptionalism in the Surveillance State 
 
In the ongoing fight against terrorism and efforts to protect America 
from foreign enemies, the American government has displayed an 
attitude toward privacy that is essentially the opposite of that shown 
when it wishes to keep documents secret. Whereas Executive Branch 
agencies have made privacy dubiously exceptional when deciding to 





84 See generally GREENWALD, supra note 9. 
85 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, supra note 82. No judicial 
discussion of this conundrum could be found during the research for this article. 
86 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(7)-(8) (2014). 
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national security effort have declared (though not in so many words) 
that personal privacy is so unexceptional that it rarely gets a fair 
hearing in debates about modern surveillance programs and 
techniques. 
 
Since 2001, the drive to protect America from real and supposed 
enemies has caused the national security and law enforcement 
establishments to come together, with both using similar surveillance 
and data tracking techniques.87 The leaders of this rising surveillance 
state have been wise in not publicly stating their disregard for personal 
privacy, and have in fact made public statements in which they claim 
to support a balance between privacy and security. For example, 
former NSA Chief Keith Alexander is on record as saying that the 
agency “has executed its national security responsibilities with equal 
and full respect for civil liberties and privacy.”88 An agency 
spokesman issued a statement in 2014 proclaiming that “NSA’s 
authorities to collect signals intelligence data include procedures that 
protect the privacy of US persons. Such protections are built into and 
cut across the entire process.”89  
 
These were statements tailored for the press and the public. The 
national security establishment’s true thoughts on citizens’ privacy 
have only been revealed in occasional leaked and declassified 
documents. For example, a document created by the NSA in 2000 
noted that the agency had been trying to “rethink and reapply” its 
procedures toward the Fourth Amendment and citizen privacy long 





87 See Trevor Aaronson, Welcome to Law Enforcement’s “Dark Side”: Secret 
Evidence, Illegal Searches, and Dubious Traffic Stops, INTERCEPT (Jan. 9, 2018, 
9:57 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/01/09/dark-side-fbi-dea-illegal-searches-
secret-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/3JZK-JX5M]. 




89 Spencer Ackerman & Martin Pengelly, NSA Statement Does Not Deny “Spying” 
on Members of Congress, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2014, 3:31 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/04/nsa-spying-bernie-sanders-
members-congress [https://perma.cc/T9JG-3FSD]. 
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this new outlook was necessary to conduct the pervasive surveillance 
enabled by a “powerful, permanent presence on a global 
telecommunications network.”90 The NSA has further claimed that the 
complexity of surveillance technology allows infringements on 
privacy and other civil liberties unless someone argues otherwise.91 
The agency has also admitted to collecting “metadata” on citizens, but 
made the misleading statement that metadata is strictly impersonal and 
does not reveal personally-identifiable information.92  
 
The official national security apparatus (made up of entities like the 
NSA, Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], Department of Homeland 
Security, and several others93) is required by law to uphold the civil 
rights and civil liberties of persons under investigation, and privacy is 
listed as one of the values to be upheld.94 The Director of National 





90 See NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY & CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, TRANSITION 
2001, at 32 (2000). 
91 Jay Hathaway, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Because Its Phone Data System Was Too 
“Complex,” DAILY DOT (Sept. 10, 2013, 2:48 PM), https://www.dailydot.com/deb 
ug/nsa-phone-data-privacy-violations-revealed/ [https://perma.cc/7NXY-2LV3]. 
This statement was originally made by then-Director of National Intelligence James 
Clapper in an internal agency blog post, which is no longer available online at the 
time of writing. 
92 See Spencer Ackerman, NSA Review Panel Casts Doubt on Bulk Data 
Collection Claims, GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2014, 4:44 PM), https://www.theguardia 
n.com/world/2014/jan/14/nsa-review-panel-senate-phone-data-terrorism 
[https://perma.cc/MJ62-WVME]. The term metadata is most easily described with 
an illustration from an older communications technology–a letter mailed to a 
friend. The content of this letter is the actual message to the friend inside the 
envelope, while the metadata is the address and the post office’s date/time stamp 
on the outside of the envelope. In modern electronic communications, metadata 
consists of IP addresses and routing numbers that may appear to be obtuse 
programming code, but it can be used quite easily to determine the identity of the 
persons who sent and received the transmission, and oftentimes a direct read of the 
content is not necessary. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying discussion. 
93 The Director of National Intelligence oversees myriad federal agencies in national 
security and law enforcement. Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., National Security Act, JUST. INFO. SHARING, https://it.ojp.go 
v/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1280 [https://perma.cc/KYA9-CHDT]. 
94 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, § 
1016(d)(2)(A), 118 Stat. 3638, 3666. 
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involved in the national security effort, must appoint a Civil Liberties 
Protection Officer to “ensure that protection of civil liberties and 
privacy is appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures 
developed for and implemented by” those agencies.95 It is important to 
note that the civil liberties being protected in these stipulations include 
those enjoyed not just by persons being investigated, but also by the 
general public, which has the right to inspect agency operations.96  
 
Regardless, the national security establishment has used privacy 
concerns to justify keeping its own operations secret, though this 
privacy is typically enjoyed by agents, not the people they are 
investigating. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that “FBI agents 
have a legitimate interest in keeping private matters that could 
conceivably subject them to annoyance or harassment.”97 Information 
about hiring practices at security agencies, and agents’ interactions 
with consultants who recommend potential new agents, have also been 
ruled as sufficiently private to withhold from public disclosure.98 This 
trend has reached some absurd heights in which privacy, but this time 
the privacy of government employees, trumped significant matters of 
the public interest. 
 
For example, in a dispute over a FOIA request for documents from the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, a district court upheld that agency’s 
decision to withhold documents about a suspected mass grave 
containing militants who had been killed during the conflict in 





95 Id. at sec. 1011, § 103(b)(1), 118 Stat. 3638, 3658. 
96 See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk & Eric B. Easton, Of Secrets and Spies: 
Strengthening the Public's Right to Know About the CIA, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 353, 379 (2006). 
97 Lahr v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (concerning a 
rejected FOIA request for documents on the investigation of a plane crash); Hunt v. 
FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1992) (concerning a rejected FOIA request for 
documents on an internal FBI investigation of an agent who had been accused of 
misconduct). 
98 Holland v. CIA, Civ. A. No. 92-1233, 1992 WL 233820 at *14-15 (D.D.C. 1992) 
(concerning the CIA’s rejection of a FOIA request, on privacy grounds, for 
information on a civilian who had written letters of recommendation for some 
potential new agents). 
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disclosure could have jeopardized their privacy.99 This reasoning was 
also used by the same district court to allow a plethora of agencies in 
the national security and law enforcement establishment—including 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Drug 
Enforcement Agency, and Department of State—to withhold requested 
documents on their investigations into the person who requested those 
documents. That person was told that he was violating his own privacy 
by requesting documents that could help him understand government 
investigations of himself.100  
 
Meanwhile, the NSA and others in the security and law enforcement 
establishment have performed some minor administrative rulemaking 
on agency privacy practices, in the expectation that disputes will arise 
when large numbers of innocent people are surveilled by public 
camera systems, drones, data mining, and the like. However, 
Christopher Slobogin considers this trend to be self-serving and that 
enforceable legislation to oversee such agency efforts is needed.101 
Those internal rulemaking efforts may or may not be in good faith, but 
the pattern of modern national security investigations shows that 
privacy has fallen far behind the other concerns of the agencies 
involved. 
 
a. National Security Investigations 
 
Political pressures, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, have justified a significant expansion of the American 





99 Physicians for Human Rights v. Dep’t of Def., 778 F. Supp. 2d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 
2011). 
100 Miller v. Dep’t of Justice, 562 F. Supp. 2d 82, 112 (D.D.C. 2008). This ruling, 
and that in the Physicians for Human Rights case discussed in supra note 99, were 
predicated on FOIA Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2016), which allows the 
withholding of documents that have been declared off-limits in a different statute. 
101 See Slobogin, supra note 11, at 1764. 
102 The primary statute that expanded the national security establishment was the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
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telecommunications technologies have facilitated the surveillance of 
the private communications of practically all American citizens, and 
the agencies have made full use of such technologies in the belief that 
enemies can be detected before they strike.103 In fact, Professor Peter 
Swire has thanked personal communications technologies for ushering 
in the “golden age of surveillance.”104  
 
Modern electronic surveillance has complicated privacy protections in 
a distinct fashion. When telecommunications and Internet activity are 
surveilled at the system level, as is often the case at the NSA, not just 
individual privacy is at stake but group privacy as well. Modern 
surveillance practices, dubbed “panvasive” by Slobogin, “are not 
aimed at specific individuals, but rather involve government invasion 
of the privacy or autonomy of a number of people, despite 
foreknowledge that most if not all of them are innocent of any 
wrongdoing.”105 Searches of wide groups of people is typically 
performed without any sort of warrant, but nonetheless have been 
generally held as permissible under Fourth Amendment procedures 
due to the supposed public interest in protection from terrorism.106  
 
Stat. 272 (2001). The USA PATRIOT Act will be discussed in more detail at infra 
notes 176-183 and accompanying text. 
103 The leading theoretician on this evolution of national security practices is Bruce 
Schneier, a network security expert and critic of the modern expansion of 
surveillance and the affiliated government policies. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, 
DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND 
CONTROL YOUR WORLD (2015); Bruce Schneier, Security or Surveillance?, 
LAWFARE (Feb. 1, 2016, 1:01 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/security-or-
surveillance [https://perma.cc/Z5VZ-HS2Q]. 
104 Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public 
Safety and Privacy, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 
6–12 (2015) (testimony of Peter Swire, Huang Professor of Law and Ethics, 
Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology). 
105 See Slobogin, supra note 11, at 1726. 
106 Id. at 1730. Slobogin located one ruling in which the Supreme Court called for 
a balancing test between security and privacy, but the ruling is considered to be an 
outlier because it was before the September 11 attacks: Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (“When faced with such special needs 
[national security efforts], we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and 
privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause 
requirements in the particular context.”). 
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However, none of this was an abrupt about-face in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks, and was instead an enhancement of surveillance 
practices that had been just as secretive, if less technologically 
advanced, for years previously. Long before the September 11 attacks, 
Executive Branch agencies in the security realm, most notably the 
NSA and CIA, had been secretive about their operations and typically 
resisted FOIA requests for information via Exemption 1,107 which 
allows the withholding of national security-related information. The 
agencies typically used this strategy without seeing any need to prove 
that the requested documents were truly relevant to national security, 
and this behavior was almost always condoned by the courts.108 This 
longtime strategy went into overdrive after the September 11 attacks, 
and has been extensively analyzed elsewhere.109 The national security 
establishment also enjoys the protection of several statutes, such as the 





107 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2016) (allowing withholding of documents that “(A) 
[are] specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to 
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in 
fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order”). 
108 See, e.g., Danae J. Aitchison, Reining in the Glomar Response: Reducing CIA 
Abuse of the Freedom of Information Act, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 219 (1993); 
Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation Over 
National Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. 
REV. 67 (1992); Scott A. Faust, National Security Information Disclosure Under 
the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial Enforcement, 25 B.C. L. REV. 611 
(1983);  Jonathan Turley, Through a Looking Glass Darkly: National Security and 
Statutory Interpretation, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 205 (2000). 
109 See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk, Holding the Spymasters Accountable after 9/11: A 
Proposed Model for CIA Disclosure Requirements Under the Freedom of 
Information Act, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 79 (2004); Halstuk & Easton, 
supra note 96; David B. McGinty, The Statutory and Executive Development of 
the National Security Exemption to Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information 
Act: Past and Future, 32 N.KY. L. REV. 67 (2005); Kathleen A. McKee, Remarks 
on the Freedom of Information Act: The National Security Exemption in a Post 
9/11 Era, 4 REGENT J. INT’L L. 263 (2006); Susan Nevelow Mart & Tom 
Ginsburg, Dis-]informing the People’s Discretion: Judicial Deference Under the 
National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, 66 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 725 (2014). 
110 50 U.S.C. §§ 3001-234 (2004). 
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Act of 1949,111 that expressly allow most, if not all, investigatory 
documents to remain off-limits to the public.112  
 
The national security establishment has also been known to cite the 
FOIA privacy exemptions when refusing requests for documents. This 
is where the agencies’ inconsistent attitudes toward privacy take on 
politicized overtones depending on the needs of the surveillance state, 
and regardless of the public interest. In a dispute directly related to the 
September 11 attacks, Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. 
Department of Justice, a coalition of public interest groups filed a 
FOIA request with the Justice Department for the names of persons 
who had been detained during the investigation of the attacks, plus 
their dates of arrest and reasons for detention or release. That 
investigation had swept up more than one thousand people.113 The 
agency withheld most of the requested information; surprisingly, it did 





111 50 U.S.C. §§ 3501-24 (1993). 
112 See Benjamin W. Cramer, Old Love for New Snoops: How Exemption 3 of 
the Freedom of Information Act Enables an Irrebuttable Presumption of 
Surveillance Secrecy, 23 COMM. L. & POL’Y 91, 113-19 (2018). Exemption 3 
of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2016), allows the withholding of documents 
that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 
552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be 
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the 
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to 
particular types of matters to be withheld.” In other words, this exemption 
allows the withholding of documents that have already been declared non- 
disclosable by a different statute. Exemption 3 is often utilized by the 
security-oriented agencies because their governing statutes, such as the 
National Security Act of 1947, declare many (if not all) documents in their 
possession to be off-limits. See generally id. 
113 331 F.3d 918, 920-21 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
114 Even though the agency did not directly cite Exemption 1, dissenting Judge 
David S. Tatel opined that an agency denial under that exemption would have been 
more believable than the law enforcement-related exemptions that were actually 
cited, due to the present urgency surrounding national security and the deference 
that had been offered to security agencies in the past thanks to that exemption’s 
rules. Id. at 939. 
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law enforcement-related provisions under Exemptions 7(A), 7(C), and 
7(F).115  
 
The second of those, protecting the privacy of persons named in law 
enforcement documents, is most relevant to the present discussion. 
The Justice Department declared that the detainees have “an obvious 
privacy interest cognizable under Exemption 7(C) in keeping secret 
the fact that they were subjects of a law enforcement investigation.”116 
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia agreed with this 
reasoning and affirmed the withholding of the requested documents.117 
The court also declared that “investigatory information” can be 
withheld under FOIA because it does not shed light on the 
“government adjudicative process,”118 thus echoing the problematic 
“central purpose” test from the Reporters Committee precedent.119  
 
The majority ruling in the Center for National Security Studies case, in 
favor of withholding the requested documents, has served as a 
precedent in which courts have generally given deference to security 
agency concerns about supposed damage to personal privacy that 
could come from disclosure, with few if any entreaties to agencies to 





115 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7)(A), 552(b)(7)(C), 552(b)(7)(F) (2002). Exemption 7(C) 
is discussed regularly throughout in this article; for the full text see supra note 3. 
Exemption 7(A) allows the withholding of law enforcement-related records that 
“could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings;” 
Exemption 7(F) allows the withholding of law enforcement-related records that 
“could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any 
individual.” 
116 331 F.3d at 945. 
117 Id. at 937. 
118 Id. at 936. 
119 See supra notes 21-28 and the accompanying discussion. 
120 See e.g., L.A. Times Commc'ns, LLC v. Dep’t of Army, 442 F. Supp. 2d 880, 
899-900 (C.D. Cal.; 2006) (a dispute over a FOIA denial in which the newspaper 
requested documents detailing “serious incident reports” submitted by private 
contractors during wartime operations in Iraq; the request was denied by the Army 
under various provisions of the law enforcement exemptions); Scudder v. CIA, 25 
F. Supp. 3d 19, 40, n.11 (D.D.C. 2014) (regarding a rejected FOIA request for 
internal CIA documents); Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 864-865 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (involving a rejected FOIA request to the NSA, CIA, and Department 
2020] CRAMER 333 
 
 
District Court for the District of Columbia and its district courts have 
continued to differentiate, as did the majority in the Center for 
National Security Studies case, between “investigatory information” 
that can be withheld under FOIA and material that can be disclosed 
because it does not shed light on a “government adjudicative 
process.”121 This further repeats the difficulties created by the 
Reporters Committee precedent, as the requester must argue that the 
requested document sheds some sort of light on governmental 
operations before being allowed to see that same document, and 
simply because a person’s name is listed in whatever fashion. 
 
In a lengthy dissent to the Center for National Security Studies ruling, 
which is considerably longer than the majority ruling, Judge David S. 
Tatel eviscerated the government’s professed concerns about personal 
privacy, uncovering some of the contradictions at the heart of this 
article’s arguments.122 Judge Tatel found the Department of Justice’s 
primary rationale to be unconvincing because the government, perhaps 
succumbing to public demands for action, had already released the 
names of several suspects including Abdulla Al Muhajir, Issaya 
Nombo, and Mohammad Mansur Jabarah with no particular regard for 
their personal privacy, and had also released the names of many of the 
attorneys representing detainees.123 Judge Tatel opined further that 
even though there would be a stigma when one’s name is attached to a 
criminal investigation, much less the investigation of a major disaster 
like the September 11 attacks, that person’s privacy interest “is clearly 
outweighed by the public interest in knowing whether the government, 
in investigating those heinous crimes, is violating the rights of persons 
it has detained.”124 
 
of State for documents related to American operations in Guatemala in the 1970s-
80s). 
121 See, e.g., Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (involving a 
rejected FOIA request for videos believed to document the torture of detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay detention camp); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Cases, 355 F. 
Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005). 
122 331 F.3d at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
123 Id. at 945, 950-51. 
124 Id. at 945-46. This conclusion was supported by the Circuit Court precedents 
Nation Magazine, Wash. Bur. v. U.S. Customs Svc., 71 F.3d 885, 894 (D.C. Cir. 




Judge Tatel was also convinced, thanks to recent news reports, that the 
federal government was abusing the investigative process by detaining 
suspects without charge or access to counsel, and that this offered 
“compelling” evidence that the requested documents were in the 
public interest because they could shed light on agency wrongdoing.125 
In conclusion, Judge Tatel pronounced the agency’s claims on the 
need to protect privacy in this FOIA denial to be “profoundly wrong,” 
and that it unfairly shifted the burden of proof from the agency to the 
requesters.126 Here Judge Tatel acknowledged, at least indirectly, the 
weaknesses of the Reporters Committee precedent. 
 
In his concluding remarks, Judge Tatel noted that persons under 
investigation may indeed have personal privacy rights, but the 
government’s claims of respecting that privacy did not match its 
actions during the September 11 investigations.127 This was only a 
dissenting opinion in the instant case, and judges in future cases have 
shown little awareness of Judge Tatel’s concerns, which would largely 
disappear from discussions of surveillance overreach in the following 
decade. 
 
Judge Tatel’s dissent in the Center for National Security Studies case 
was acknowledged by the District of Columbia District Court in 2006 
in a statement on how categorical withholding of security documents 
by government agencies without further discussion “would eviscerate 
the principles of openness in government that the FOIA embodies.”128 
 
1995), and Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Housing & Urban 
Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
125 331 F.3d at 946-48. Here Judge Tatel cited precedent in Rosenfeld v. Dep't of 
Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 812 (9th Cir.1995), in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that FOIA 
Exemption 7(C) does not justify withholding the identities of persons being 
investigated (by the FBI in that case) if the documents in question could shed light 
on the agency’s investigative practices. 
126 331 F.3d at 950. 
127 Id. at 951-52.  
128 Long v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 450 F. Supp. 2d 42, 76 (D.D.C. 2006) (concerning 
a FOIA request for documents on the management of a database that collects 
documents on United States Attorneys; the agency was ordered to release some 
documents while the remainder of its FOIA denial was upheld). 
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This was not dispositive to the FOIA dispute at hand, however, 
because the court concluded that documents could be withheld as long 
as government agencies provide legitimate concerns of risks to 
security investigations if requested documents are disclosed, and that 
courts should defer to such concerns.129 Notwithstanding this ruling, 
which did not lead to disclosure anyway, the judges in later disputes 
over the disclosure of information on surveillance and security 
investigations have barely noticed the national security establishment’s 
functionally absurd use of privacy values to justify the secrecy of those 
operations. 
 
b. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
 
The national security establishment has found yet another way to 
justify its curtailment of personal privacy, by assuming that Americans 
may not be justified in expecting to have privacy at all. As opposed to 
the government’s concern for personal privacy when withholding 
agency documents, the NSA and its brethren have long taken 
advantage of Supreme Court precedents confirming that citizens 
actually have no “reasonable expectation of privacy” toward electronic 
communications, which of course are the focus of the modern 
surveillance state. 
 
As far back as the Olmstead case in 1928, the Supreme Court ruled 
that there is no violation of rights, under the Fourth or Fifth 
Amendments, when law enforcement personnel wiretap personal 
telephone lines.130 Wiretapping laws dating back to the early 
Twentieth Century, and their attendant judicial precedents, are still 
used to justify modern electronic surveillance of telecommunications 
and Internet usage.131 The Olmstead decision was partially overturned 
in the 1967 Katz ruling, if wiretapping is done in a public place.132 





129 Id. at 77-78. 
130 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
131 See Blake Covington Norvell, The Constitution and the NSA Warrantless 
Wiretapping Program: A Fourth Amendment Violation, 11 YALE J. L. & TECH. 228, 
235-43 (2008); Cramer, supra note 112, at 121-22. 
132 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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of privacy which citizens apparently enjoy in public,133 though later 
courts have ruled that this expectation is sacrificed when people use 
telecommunications services voluntarily, or when there is a public 
interest in security and law enforcement inspection of those same 
services.134  
 
The reasonable expectation of privacy becomes distorted when 
someone other than the government (police, security officials, etc.) has 
access to personal data. When private companies like 
telecommunications firms, and now Internet firms, have access to 
personal data, the assumption is that the person has handed this 
information over voluntarily, at which point the reasonable expectation 
of privacy expires even if that information is later forwarded to the 
government. This is known as the third-party effect,135 which was first 
addressed by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland in 1979,136 
resulting in a landmark ruling that the American national security 
establishment has used to justify its activities ever since. In short, 
individuals can be blamed for sacrificing their own privacy by handing 
data to telecommunications companies that then hand it to the 
government, and in this realm the government is far less concerned 
about personal privacy than it is when denying FOIA requests for 
documents about its operations. 
 
The Smith case involved a criminal defendant who had been suspected 
of making harassing phone calls to his victim. The police inspected 
Mr. Smith’s calling records and determined that he had indeed called 
the victim’s phone number, leading to his arrest. Mr. Smith argued that 
the police’s inspection of phone company records of his calls was a 
search of his personal effects, and per the Fourth Amendment a 





133 The phrase reasonable expectation of privacy, which has since been used in 
many (if not most) judicial decisions on electronic surveillance, was first used by 
Justice John Marshall Harlan in a concurrence to the Katz ruling. Id. at 361; see 
also Slobogin, supra note 11, at 1746. 
134 See Yesner, supra note 11, at 160. 
135 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 102-10 (2011). 
136 442 U.S. 735. 
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Smith “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone 
company.”137 Furthermore, as a phone company customer, Smith 
should have known that the company would need to know this 
information in order to function properly as it connected his calls. 
Thus, he did not have a reason to expect his calling information to be 
private.138  
 
Furthermore, in Smith the Court acknowledged the third-party effect, 
but in favor of telecommunications network companies, by ruling that 
warrant procedures under the Fourth Amendment apply when 
government authorities search you and your possessions directly, but 
not when they search information that you have given to a third party 
(such as a phone company) voluntarily.139 This ruling established the 
precedent that a person’s use of a telecommunications network is 
completely voluntary, which may have been a viable conclusion for 
old landline telephone systems in 1979, but which may no longer be 
tenable in modern times when advanced electronic networks are 
heavily integrated into everyday life, while those networks collect 
massive amounts of personal data that is of great interest to the 
surveillance state.140  
 
Thanks to Smith v. Maryland, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
question, and the fact that Americans do not have this expectation, has 
justified government searches of the information collected by far more 
advanced telecommunications and Internet systems. For example, in 
1983 the Supreme Court ruled that individuals do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy on public thoroughfares that are 
surveilled by police cameras,141 and three years later the Court ruled 
that aerial surveillance of public places is not a violation of 





137 Id. at 744. 
138 Id. at 743. 
139 Id. at 744. 
140 Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of 
Privacy in Public, 17 L. & PHIL. 559 (1998). 
141 U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (using the synonymous term 
“legitimate expectation of privacy”). 
142 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986). 




Smith v. Maryland and its followers have been used to justify ultra-
modern surveillance of citizens via drones, GPS, and data mining.143 
While the Supreme Court stated in 2001 that “[i]t would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology,”144 the law enforcement and national security apparatus 
has been allowed to reap the benefits of these new technologies, as 
long as proper procedures are observed. For example, in 2012 the 
Court stated in the Jones case that direct surveillance of a criminal 
suspect’s movements via GPS is a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment, but ultimately ruled that the police officers in the case 
had followed warrant procedures properly.145 The Court merely hinted, 
with evident reluctance, that privacy issues may arise when the 
resulting data is collected long-term146 and/or disseminated over 
telecommunications networks,147 where the citizen’s lack of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from Smith v. Maryland still holds. 
 
Two years later, the Supreme Court reached a similar determination on 
how there is no privacy violation if warrant procedures are followed 
properly when police examine a person’s cellular phone.148 The Court 
has since added some narrow categories of information for which 
proper warrant procedures must be followed before government agents 
can collect the data, including location information housed in one’s 
“smart” phone.149 In that ruling the Court determined that a citizen has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning his whereabouts and 





143 See Slobogin, supra note 11, at 1746-47. 
144 Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001). 
145 U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
146 Id. at 431 (Alito, J., concurring). 
147 Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
148 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit 
made a similar determination about proper warrant procedures when police 
examine cellular network calling records. U.S. v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (2015); 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari for this case in Davis v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 
479, 480 (2015). 
149 Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
2020] CRAMER 339 
 
 
telecommunications networks and devices,150 but again it is important 
to note that this expectation can still be defeated when balanced with 
the needs of law enforcement, so long as agents follow the proper 
warrant procedures under the Fourth Amendment.151  
 
It has thus been established in these precedents that citizens may have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy for personal information that can 
be found on modern telecommunications networks and the Internet, 
but even if they do, law enforcement officials can still obtain a warrant 
to see that information. The outcome for personal privacy is even less 
favorable when the national security establishment wants a person’s 
communications records, especially if the fight against terrorism is 
used as justification. The power of antiterrorism rhetoric in defeating 
privacy concerns can be seen in a crucial split precedent at the district 
court level. 
 
In two nearly identical cases directly inspired by the Snowden 
revelations, citizens sought damages from unauthorized surveillance 
by the NSA.152 In late 2013, the federal district court in the District of 
Columbia ruled in Klayman v. Obama that the NSA’s mass 
surveillance program is likely unconstitutional because modern 
telecommunications networks are pervasive, as is the ability of the 
government to track our usage of them, and this is a new phenomenon 
that deserves an updated Fourth Amendment analysis.153 Here the 
District Court for the District of Columbia largely repudiated the Smith 
v. Maryland precedent on voluntary use of telecommunications 





150 Id. at 2217. 
151 The Court ruled that the police officers in the instant case, who did not obtain a 
warrant before collecting cellular network information on Carpenter’s locations 
and movements while he was under investigation, had violated his “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in that type of information. But ultimately, the Court ruled 
that this violation could have been avoided with proper warrant procedures. Id. at 
2221. 
152 Benjamin W. Cramer, A Proposal to Adopt Data Discrimination Rather 
than Privacy as the Justification for Rolling Back Data Surveillance, 8 J. INFO. 
POL’Y 5, 11-12 (2018). 
153 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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the face of antiterrorism rhetoric from the national security 
establishment.154  
 
Just days after the Klayman ruling, the Southern District Court of New 
York ruled in American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper that the NSA 
surveillance program did not violate the Fourth Amendment due to the 
reasonableness of national security investigations.155 This ruling shows 
the power of the antiterrorism argument, which was discussed 
prominently in the ruling, while the citizen’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy and the pervasiveness of modern data collection networks 
were not discussed at all.156 These two rulings, which both addressed 
the NSA’s attitude toward personal privacy when widely surveilling 
citizens to supposedly protect America from terrorist attacks, resulted 
in a split precedent that should be addressed by a higher court,157 but 
this has not yet happened at the time of writing. 
 
c. New Technologies and Emergency Surveillance 
 
As far back as 1975, a Congressional committee opined that each 
Presidential administration develops its own new secrecy techniques 
that become more sophisticated over time, while also finding new 
ways to infringe on the privacy of citizens.158 The government 
surveillance operations revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013 are a 
particularly insidious manifestation of this trend.159 America has had 
great difficulty addressing the conflict between surveillance and 
privacy, and surveillance is currently winning this battle thanks to new 





154 Cramer, supra note 152, at 9-10.  
155 American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 756-57 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
156 Acknowledgement of these matters cannot be found in the Clapper ruling. Id. 
157 Gary Schmitt, A Tale of Two Judges: The NSA on Trial, WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 
13, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/gary-schmitt/a-tale-of-two-
judges [https://perma.cc/MM3E-727H]. 
158 Mart & Ginsburg, supra note 109, at 763, n.206. 
159 Id. at 763. 
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toward greater government access to personal information that is 
stored in modern telecommunications networks.160  
 
The American government played a major role in developing the 
technologies that enabled the modern surveillance state, from punch 
cards to GPS, exhibiting a long-term goal of collecting data on citizens 
rather than observing any privacy rights they may have. Meanwhile, 
expanded government services in the second half of the Twentieth 
Century, such as welfare and unemployment benefits, required the 
collection of vast amounts of personal data for which the government 
developed the necessary databases and collection techniques. Those 
have since been adopted by the national security and law enforcement 
establishments.161 The Smith v. Maryland precedent has enabled 
government surveillance of citizens through the use of the invasive 
techniques that it had a hand in inventing, because they are now used 
by telecommunications companies as well. Thus, we have seen the rise 
of a new “surveillance state” or “surveillance society” in which 
government collection of personal data is built into everyday 
technological reality, and this raises significant risks of privacy 
violations by government officials who find doing so to be easier and 
easier.162  
 
A 2013 audit of operations at the NSA found thousands of privacy 
violations in just one year, averaging about eight per day. Furthermore, 
this only included unlawful invasions of the privacy of persons who 
were actually being investigated, and not the bystanders who were 
swept up in the mass electronic surveillance of large groups.163 In the 





160 See Reidenberg, supra note 11, at 595. 
161 See Balkin, supra note 11, at 6. 
162 See Ohm, supra note 11, at 1318. 
163 See Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year 
Audit Finds, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-
thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-
49ddc7417125_story.html [https://perma.cc/97KF-NWPW]. The audit covered the 
period from April 2011 to March 2012 and was performed by inspecting documents 
that had been leaked by Edward Snowden. 
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nobody at [the] NSA who really had a full understanding of how the 
program was operating at the time.”164 The NSA and its affiliated 
agencies have a vast number of surveillance systems and techniques 
that even they do not completely understand, and it is unrealistic to 
assume that the other branches of the government can oversee them all 
continuously. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that only select 
members of Congress or the President’s office are allowed to know 
about sensitive security programs.165  
 
In the wake of the Edward Snowden revelations, the NSA and its 
brethren claimed that the content of personal communications was not 
being tracked, just the metadata attached to transmissions, perhaps to 
give the impression that metadata is not inherently invasive of one’s 
personal privacy and therefore the agencies are dedicated to preserving 
that virtue. In this light, President Barack Obama stated that the 
collection of metadata by the national security apparatus is only “a 
minor infringement of privacy.”166 However, experts determined long 
ago that “NSA analysts can exploit [metadata] to develop a portrait of 
an individual, one that is perhaps more complete and predictive of 
behavior than could be obtained by listening to phone conversations or 
reading emails.”167  
 
At the higher level, after the September 11 attacks it did not take long 
for the American government to summarily dismiss most concerns 
about citizens’ privacy if it could cite security and the fight against 
terrorism as justifications. In 2004, former Clinton Administration 
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, in his testimony to the 9/11 





164 See Scott Shane, Court Upbraided N.S.A. on Its Use of Call-Log Data, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/us/court-upbraided-
nsa-on-its-use-of-call-log-data.html [https://perma.cc/6BY4-94U2].  
165 See Balkin, supra note 11, at 21. 
166 See Yesner, supra note 11, at 149. For an explanation of the term metadata, see 
supra note 92. 
167 See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of U.S. 
Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-
citizens.html [https://perma.cc/DN7T-MGRB]. 
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in-depth public discussion-among our citizens and not just our elected 
officials-regarding what compromises on privacy we are willing to 
accept in order to remain safe and free.”168 Overall, the 9/11 
Commission stressed the need for knowledge amongst the citizenry 
about national security efforts, but expected the public to sacrifice 
privacy in return for protection and security from the government.169 
 
The citizenry had also been told to accept greater governmental 
secrecy for these reasons. In a memo to Executive Branch agencies 
written just after the September 11 attacks, then- Attorney General 
John Ashcroft urged the agencies to disclose information “only after 
full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and 
personal privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure of 
information.”170 This appears to place privacy on par with other 
important values, but later in the same document, agencies are 
instructed to defend withholding decisions “unless they lack a sound 
legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the 
ability of other agencies to protect other important records.”171 In other 
words, the ability of other agencies to perform investigations with the 
first agency’s documents was paramount. This was not a new law 
making agency records more secretive, but it was an interpretation of 
FOIA procedures recommending that agencies find reasons to keep 
documents secret and to defend those decisions as justified by the fight 
against terrorism.172 In practice, Ashcroft instructed agencies to only 
grant FOIA requests for documents after finding a “sound legal basis” 
for doing so, regardless of questions of privacy or the other values 





168 See Eighth Public Hearing Before the Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks, 108th 
Cong. 24 (2004), (statement of William S. Cohen, Sec. of Def.), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing8/cohen_statement.pdf (emphasis 
added). 
169 See Halstuk & Easton, supra note 96, at 383. 
170 See ATT’Y GEN. JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR 
HEADS OF ALL FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (2001), https://www.ju 
stice.gov/archive/oip/011012.htm. 
171 Id. 
172 See McGinty, supra note 109, at 113. 
173 See Keith Anderson, Is There Still a “Sound Legal Basis?”: The Freedom of 
Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605 (2003); Jane E. 




Paradoxically, on that same day Ashcroft instructed federal agencies to 
balance the need for an “informed citizenry” with the public interest in 
“safeguarding our national security, enhancing the effectiveness of our 
law enforcement agencies, protecting sensitive business information 
and, not least, preserving personal privacy.”174 Here, Ashcroft again 
appeared to be respecting privacy as a value equal to the others, but 
there is little evidence that this supposed concern came to fruition as 
agencies were instructed to keep citizens from knowing how their 
privacy was being violated by the rising surveillance state. Once again, 
this could be justified with the need for security. The new laws coming 
together at the time, such as the USA PATRIOT Act,175 placed a much 
sounder legal basis on the fight against terrorism, with significantly 
less regard for other values including privacy.176  
 
National emergencies demonstrate that values such as privacy and 
public knowledge can be redefined and restricted to reflect the state of 
public fear, while courts are likely to sympathize with an emergency 
curtailment of civil rights.177 For example, the USA PATRIOT Act, 
which according to well-placed critics included severe curtailments of 
privacy,178 was rushed through Congress during a period of national 
 
Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of Terror: The Bush 
Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 479, 
491 (2006).  
174 See ASHCROFT, supra note 170.  
175 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
176 See Kathleen A. McKee, Remarks on the Freedom of Information Act: The 
National Security Exemption in a Post 9/11 Era, 4 REGENT J. INTL’ L. 263, 272-73 
(2006). 
177 See Wagner, supra note 40, at 396. 
178 See ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, THE CONSTITUTION IN EXILE: HOW THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT HAS SEIZED POWER BY REWRITING THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND 
209-237 (2006); RON PAUL, THE REVOLUTION: A MANIFESTO 110 (2008). Andrew 
Napolitano, a former state Superior Court judge, also wrote that “The PATRIOT Act 
and its progeny are the most abominable, unconstitutional governmental assaults on 
personal freedom since the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.” See ANDREW P. 
NAPOLITANO, THE FREEDOM ANSWER BOOK: HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING 
AWAY YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS 129 (2012). 
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anxiousness just after the September 11 attacks and was passed into 
law before most of the representatives had read its text.179 The USA 
PATRIOT Act obliterated many previously-enacted checks on the 
federal government’s ability to obtain personal information about 
citizens and track their movements.180 The Act also enabled the trading 
of citizens’ personal information among a multitude of secrecy-prone 
agencies in the national security apparatus,181 and weakened pre-
existing privacy laws like the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Financial 
Right to Privacy Act if mandated by a security investigation.182  
 
Hence, the public has been expected to give up privacy protections for 
reasons of security, which is easy to justify during times of real or 
supposed emergency.183 Benjamin Franklin’s famous quote, “[t]hose 
who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety,”184 has held true after the 
September 11 attacks, but the American government has crafted rules 
to force this choice on the citizenry by disregarding privacy by fiat, 
and this strategy has largely been endorsed by the courts. 
 
Judicial deference for surveillance when justified by security has only 
experienced one notable roadblock since the earliest days of 
wiretapping. In a concurrence to the Katz ruling in 1967, Supreme 
Court Justice William O. Douglas declared that such deference would 
create a “wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to 
resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the 





179 See Yesner, supra note 11, at 173-74. 
180 See Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security with 
Privacy Under the USA Patriot Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375, 378 (2002). 
181 USA PATRIOT Act § 504. 
182 See Mell, supra note 180, at 393-94. 
183 See Cramer, supra note 154, at 6-12. 
184 SUZY PLATT, ED. RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 201 
(1992). This quote is often used by privacy activists and critics of surveillance, but 
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because it was unreasonable to assume that Executive Branch officials 
could be “neutral and disinterested” observers of the unintended 
consequences of national security efforts.185  
 
But otherwise, the modern surveillance state has faced little resistance 
from the courts. Legal scholar David Cole has declared that “courts are 
largely ineffectual on matters of national security” after reviewing 
ignoble historical episodes like President Abraham Lincoln’s 
suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the internment of 
Japanese Americans during World War II, and Senator Joseph 
McCarthy’s harassment of citizens that were merely suspected of 
Communist sympathies during the Red Scare of the 1950s.186 All of 
these received deference from the Supreme Court.187 The 
government’s overuse of security concerns to justify increased secrecy 
and invasions of personal privacy could be legitimate, or it could be 
mere opportunism in light of public outrage over a security 
emergency, at which time legislators and the judiciary willingly allow 
rights to be curtailed.188  
 
America is very slowly recovering from the security-obsessed 
curtailment of civil liberties after the September 11 attacks. Many of 
the USA PATRIOT Act’s surveillance-enabling provisions sunsetted 
in 2015, though some were preserved in the USA FREEDOM Act of 
that year and remain in effect.189 Some of the more egregious NSA 
surveillance programs were discontinued in 2017 due to conflicts with 
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reportedly shut down in early 2019.191 However, many of the statutory 
provisions that allow these types of surveillance remain on the books 
at the time of writing, and the absence of direct legal authorization has 
not stopped the NSA and its brethren from taking advantage of the 
technological ease of surveillance systems that already exist.192  
 
Despite the references to privacy in the orders and statutes used by the 
national security establishment, legal scholar Paul Ohm has declared 
that privacy is disappearing in the modern world, thanks to both new 
technologies and increased governmental surveillance.193 Even when 
they claim to observe privacy protections, national security and law 
enforcement agencies can get away with not doing so thanks to old 
precedents on the reasonable expectation of privacy and third-party 
effect doctrines from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,194 with little 
concern for the fact that those precedents pertained to old-school law 
enforcement by police officers on foot rather than new-school 
surveillance by mysterious agents sitting at computer terminals.195  
Since existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has determined that 
the Amendment does not confer a comprehensive right of privacy, it 
has been largely unable to restrain modern electronic surveillance.196 
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antiterrorism, the courts have not hesitated in favoring surveillance 
over privacy.197  
 
Therefore, the surveillance state’s claims of protecting personal 
privacy as a virtue are not supported by its actions in conducting 
national security-oriented investigations, and few courts have noticed 
that the agencies’ concerns for privacy are disingenuous. This arm of 
the American government, through its actions if not necessarily its 
words, has engaged in a new form of privacy unexceptionalism by 





The United States government has displayed two contradictory 
viewpoints on the value of a citizen’s personal privacy. Absurdly, both 
of these attitudes have been used to justify government secrecy. On the 
one hand, privacy is being used increasingly as the justification for 
withholding government-held documents under FOIA Exemptions 6 
and 7(C), thus preventing public knowledge of the governmental 
operations discussed in those documents. Conversely, privacy 
concerns are powerless in reducing the secrecy of the surveillance 
state. Hence, a government that praises privacy as a reason for 
withholding documents ignores that same value when collecting 
personal data on citizens. 
 
There are two possible solutions for this conundrum. Given the 
surveillance state’s disdain for privacy, the judiciary could place less 
credence in agency denials of FOIA requests in which personal 
privacy has been cited, thus enabling more disclosure of documents 
that can inform the public on how the government does business. Or, 
the judiciary could recall the government’s concern for personal 
privacy in FOIA denials as a reason to reject the security 
establishment’s reasoning for extending its electronic surveillance 
operations. Either of those options would make a certain logical sense, 
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the government’s invasion of privacy could be considered on a case-
by-case basis. It is important to note that privacy and security are not a 
zero-sum game, as it is possible to have both.198 Or as this article 
suggests, it may be possible to have both full disclosure of 
government-held documents and relief from invasive surveillance. 
 
The American government, however, has invoked the spurious 
“privacy or security” dichotomy in two contradictory ways. First, 
privacy values prevent public understanding of government-held 
documents; second, citizens’ understanding of their loss of privacy is 
prevented by the need for security. Either way, the public knows less 
about governmental operations, and this violates the pro-transparency 
philosophy of FOIA, which Congress justified in 1966 by citing the 
need for a broad philosophy of open government and the democratic 
ideal of an informed citizenry. As noted by the House of 
Representatives, access to government-held documents is essential 
because the “intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and 
quality of its information varies.”199 The Senate also observed that “it 
is only when one further considers the hundreds of departments, 
branches, and agencies which are not directly responsible to the 
people, that one begins to understand the great importance of having 
an information policy of full disclosure.”200  
 
In the words of Paul Ohm, “If we woke up tomorrow in a world 
without privacy, we might also find ourselves in a world without 
constitutional protection from new, invasive police powers. This bleak 
scenario is not science fiction, for tomorrow we will likely wake up in 
that world.”201  While Ohm opined that privacy is collapsing under the 
sheer invasiveness of the surveillance state, the present article also 
argues that privacy is in danger of disappearing as a virtue because 
American citizens have been prevented from learning about how it is 
being infringed. The American government abuses the spirit of privacy 
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maintaining secrecy through the nondisclosure of documents and 
expanding the questionable surveillance powers of the national 
security and law enforcement establishments. This contradictory 
pattern violates both the pro-disclosure spirit of FOIA and the spirit of 
agency discretion toward personal information that fueled the Privacy 
Act.202  
 
While privacy has become exceptional when the American 
government seeks to keep agency documents secret, privacy has been 
treated as unexceptional by the surveillance state. This is an awkward, 
contradictory, and two-faced stance on an important social value. 
More specifically, governmental transparency is defeated by privacy 
concerns in FOIA jurisprudence, while privacy concerns are defeated 
by the non-transparency of the surveillance state. Both of these serve 
as forms of nondisclosure; the former is literal and the latter is de 
facto. Agencies that withhold requested documents, and other agencies 
that conduct invasive electronic surveillance, have escaped full 
accountability by misusing the spirit of privacy in disingenuous 
fashions. The government cannot have it both ways—if it claims to 
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